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[The] conjunction of an immense military establish-
ment and a large arms industry is new in the Ameri-
can experience. . . . [W]e must guard against the acqui-
sition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The
potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power
exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of
this combination endanger our liberties or democrat-
ic processes.
–President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1961)1
When President Eisenhower uttered this warn-
ing in his farewell address, he forever ½xed in the
public mind the idea–in its most histrionic mani-
festation–of an ever-present menace posed by
grasping arms merchants in league with war-mon-
gering generals. This cabal, so the theory goes,
lurks in the shadows waiting for an unguarded
moment in which to subvert the American way of
life for its own venal purposes. To writer James
Ledbetter, the stereotype of the shady arms 
merchant is still alive and well. In a New York 
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Times article from late 2010, he contends,
“It is not a stretch to believe that the ar-
maments industry–which pro½ts not
only from domestic sales but also from
tens of billions of dollars in annual ex-
ports–manipulates public policy to per-
petuate itself.”2
With total annual U.S. defense expen-
ditures now exceeding $700 billion, Ei-
senhower’s celebrated caution seems 
to many observers to be as apt today as
ever. Indeed, in the November/Decem-
ber 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs, political
commentator William Pfaff argues that
the full-time, professional military–
“supplemented by a nearly equivalent
number of civilian mercenaries”–sub-
stitutes for the “citizens’ army” he be-
lieves conscription produced in the past.
The result, he declares, is a force “direct-
ly accountable only to the Pentagon [and
one that] exists primarily to augment the
national ‘military-industrial complex’
against which President Dwight Eisen-
hower warned.”3
Pfaff’s concerns are hardly limited to
the “military” portion of Eisenhower’s
dictum. He also asserts that “defense and
security industries,” “the most impor-
tant” components of the U.S. manufac-
turing sector, are positioned to “domi-
nate Congress, as well as an inexperi-
enced administration” via the industries’
“corporate interests.” To Pfaff, the Unit-
ed States is “a state owned by its army.”4
Ledbetter and Pfaff are not alone in
their critique of the interplay between
military money and American policy and
stature abroad. In a May 2010 speech,
Republican Representative Ron Paul of
Texas railed against “blank checks to the
military-industrial complex,” which, he
maintains, does little to defend against
authentic threats. Paul contends that
costly overseas military operations “in
many cases foment resentment that does
not make us safer, but instead makes us 
a target.” Further, if military spending is
inadequately examined, he argues, it will
exacerbate the U.S. budget crisis that is
“bankrupting the nation and destroying
our own currency.”5
To what extent do the concerns raised
by Ledbetter, Pfaff, and Paul reflect Eisen-
hower’s original thinking? If America’s
powerful military is popular and trusted
by the electorate, does its reputation indi-
cate the “proper meshing” of military and
industry that the farewell address calls
for? Or should we be as concerned today
as Eisenhower was ½ve decades ago?
Eisenhower was apparently thinking 
of the future, not accusing contemporary
institutions of malevolence. Referring to
“unwarranted influence” both “sought”
and “unsought,” he took care not to cast
aspersions on anyone. In fact, recent
scholarship reveals that Eisenhower de-
liberately toned down his language from
that of more antagonistic earlier drafts.6
As the former ½ve-star general who led
the allied effort to defeat the Nazis, he, of
all people, appreciated the need for a
powerful military buttressed by a strong
and creative industrial infrastructure. 
Rather than criticizing either the mil-
itary or the arms industry, Eisenhower
merely pointed out that the Cold War had
created for the ½rst time in American his-
tory a need to maintain, in a period of pu-
tative peace, a very large military estab-
lishment as well as an equally sizable
arms industry. To Eisenhower, this un-
precedented phenomenon required con-
stant scrutiny by the electorate. An “alert
and knowledgeable citizenry,” he said,
was necessary to ensure “the proper mesh-
ing of the huge industrial and military
machinery of defense . . . so that security
and liberty may prosper together.”7
The prescription for an “alert and knowl-
edgeable citizenry” is perhaps the stron-
gest rationale for the continuing vitality
136
The
Military-
Industrial
Complex
Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
of Eisenhower’s speech–albeit for rea-
sons he may not have anticipated. In
truth, a robust “military-industrial com-
plex” remains an essential element of a
democracy facing diverse and existen-
tial threats in a dangerous world. In the
twenty-½rst century, however, America’s
citizenry needs to be alert not just to the
risk of capitalism cum militarism run
amok, but also–paradoxically–to the
perils of a declining military-industrial
enterprise. Surprisingly, accumulating
evidence shows that the complex’s once-
feared power is rapidly and dangerously
ebbing. Virtually all experts agree that
America’s armed forces have achieved–
and continue to maintain–their martial
dominance not just because of the quali-
ty of their combatants, but also because
of the superiority and abundance of their
weaponry and equipment. Those attri-
butes, in turn, are the result of the crea-
tivity and productivity that a highly com-
petitive free-enterprise system generates. 
In the defense sector, however, that com-
petitiveness is evidently waning. In 2008,
the Defense Science Board glumly noted
how the military-industrial complex had
transformed since Eisenhower expressed
his qualms:
The U.S. Defense industrial base changed
signi½cantly . . . since the end of the Cold
War. . . . From ½fty major defense contrac-
tors at the beginning of the 1990s, the de-
fense industry consolidated into six large
defense ½rms by the end of the decade.
While competition still occurs between a
few ½rms in each sector, the Government
buyer can no longer bene½t from a highly
competitive defense market.8
In its 2010 report to Congress on in-
dustrial capabilities, the Pentagon insists
that it still relies on market forces to main-
tain the vitality of the industrial base. At
the same time, it reiterates concerns
about the loss of competition to consoli-
dation over the past decade, conceding
further that “the pace of these consolida-
tions does not seem to be slackening.”9
Consolidation does not, as Eisenhower’s
admonition might have supposed, trans-
late into an even more powerful and unit-
ed military-industrial establishment; to
the contrary, consolidation reflects the
complex’s declining fortunes.
Decline? With a budget of over $700
billion? How can the military-industrial
complex be eroding given that the U.S.
share of defense spending amounts to
nearly 48 percent of the worldwide total?
While these ½gures may seem remark-
able, military spending as a percentage 
of gdp has dropped strikingly since the
Eisenhower era. In 1961, defense spend-
ing constituted 9.4 percent of gdp10; by
2010, it had fallen by half, to 4.7 percent,
and much of that is not headed to arms
makers’ coffers. 
This shift is caused in part by changes
in how the Pentagon identi½es and re-
sponds to threats. In the latest version of
the congressionally mandated Quadren-
nial Defense Review, the Pentagon de-
clares that “America’s interests and role
in the world require armed forces with
unmatched capabilities”; nevertheless, it
narrows that globally oriented perspec-
tive by de½ning its top objective as pre-
vailing in “today’s wars” in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
The focus on Iraq and Afghanistan has
signi½cant implications for the defense in-
dustry because the strategy employed in
those wars is manpower-intensive and in-
clined toward low-tech solutions. Based
on the highly acclaimed counterinsur-
gency doctrine authored largely by the
popular and politically savvy General
David Petraeus, the strategy eschews tech-
nology, arms, and equipment. Instead,
the approach favors deploying masses of
foot soldiers, each one prepared to be-
come a “social worker, a civil engineer, a
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school teacher, a nurse, a boy scout.”11
Embraced by liberals and conservatives
alike, the doctrine justi½ed a huge expan-
sion of American ground forces.12
A manpower-centric strategy is, howev-
er, extremely costly. The military spends
about $1 million to deploy a single soldier
to Afghanistan for one year.13 Moreover,
the cost of military personnel, deployed
or not, is soaring. With expenditures for
military health care alone now topping
$50 billion a year, Defense Secretary
Robert Gates understandably claims that
such expenses are “eating the Defense
Department alive.” Unlike Eisenhower’s
era of poorly compensated conscription
forces, today the Department of Defense
(dod) must fund a growing panoply of
bene½ts and inducements enacted to sup-
port the all-volunteer military since the
draft ended in 1973. 
Financing this new kind of military is
creating what one Pentagon of½cial has
called a looming “½scal calamity.” The
consequences for the arms industry are
clear: an unnamed of½cial told The Wash-
ington Post that the “government’s gen-
erosity [toward military personnel] is
unsustainable” and that such expenses
will leave the Pentagon with “less money
to buy weapons.”14 Few of what dollars
remain will be allocated to the expensive
“Cold War” weaponry and missiles that
concerned Eisenhower.15
The producers of intercontinental bal-
listic missiles, for example, are unlikely
to acquire the “misplaced power” Eisen-
hower feared. To the contrary, Ilan Ber-
man of the American Foreign Policy
Council warns: “[P]ractically every de-
clared nuclear weapon state is engaged in
a serious modernization of its strategic
arsenal. The United States, by contrast,
has allowed its strategic infrastructure to
atrophy since the end of the Cold War.”16
Sophisticated weaponry does not ap-
pear to be a Pentagon priority, notwith-
standing the influential status supposed-
ly enjoyed by arms makers. Secretary
Gates plainly states that “any major
weapons program, in order to remain vi-
able, will have to show some utility and
relevance to the kind of irregular cam-
paigns that . . . are most likely to engage
America’s military in the coming de-
cades.”17 Irrelevant, it seems, are the big-
ticket, high-technology air and naval
platforms that enriched many defense
½rms in Eisenhower’s day.
To be sure, equipment still plays a vital
role in irregular warfare. Retired Army
General Barry McCaffrey argues that the
combined effects of such developments
as unmanned drones and hyper-accurate
munitions have “fundamentally changed
warfare.”18 However, many of those ad-
vances do not necessarily reflect new pro-
grams that stimulate industry to produce
particularly inventive or revolutionary
technologies. Rather, these innovations
more often represent a repurposing of
existing equipment designed and built
for use against Cold War adversaries.
Notably, one of the largest new equip-
ment programs speci½cally designed to
address the “irregular campaigns” that
Secretary Gates refers to did not emanate
from the machinations of the military-
industrial complex or, for that matter, the
Pentagon. Congress initiated the $35 bil-
lion Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected
(mrap) vehicle program in response to
constituent complaints about horri½c
injuries to soldiers from improvised ex-
plosive devices (ieds) in Iraq and, later,
in Afghanistan. In terms of impact on the
industrial base, the mrap venture pro-
duced few new or dramatic innovations. 
Why did the program fail to encourage
technological advancement? The urgen-
cy of the acquisition program required it
to rely “only on proven technologies 
and commercially available products.”
Further, in order to rapidly “expand lim-
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ited production capacity,” contracts were
spread to nine commercial sources.”19
Even with these precautions, the program
is not without dif½culties. Indeed, the
Congressional Research Service recent-
ly reported that “almost 5,000 mraps in
Afghanistan are not being used because
of their size and weight” as well as “pos-
sible redundancies” with other equip-
ment.20 This excess inventory all but guar-
antees that the manufacturers will not co-
alesce into a permanent military-indus-
trial entity capable of the overreaching
Eisenhower feared.
Initially, contractors providing services
seemed to fare better than arms makers
in pro½ting from Gates’s “irregular cam-
paigns.” Counterinsurgency expert T. X.
Hammes argues that the extensive use of
such contractors–including those that
provide armed security services–in con-
flict areas “aligned with previous deci-
sions and the administration’s faith in
the ef½ciency and effectiveness of private
business compared to governmental or-
ganization.”21 However, widely reported
allegations of abuse and fraud obliged
Congress to intervene. Beginning with
the creation, in 2004, of the Of½ce of the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Re-
construction,22 Congress used investiga-
tions, hearings, and new laws to rein in
contractors in war zones.23 With more
regulation likely to be forthcoming, it
seems clear that even if this assemblage
of contractors had designs on “unwar-
ranted influence,” recent events have con-
spired to prevent such an outcome. 
Additionally, the halcyon days for ser-
vice support and advisory contractors
stationed away from the battle½eld
appear to have ended as well. Secre-
tary Gates concludes that the dod has
“grown over-reliant on contractors.” He
suggests they “may be performing func-
tions that should be done by full-time
government employees, including man-
aging other contractors.” Consequent-
ly, Gates directed the dod to “reduce
funding for service support contractors
by 10 percent each year for the next three
years.”24 Accordingly, much of the work
formerly done by outside contractors is
being in-sourced to dod employees.25
All this activity portends the weakening
influence of contractors in the Pentagon
and elsewhere.
The complexities of defense acquisi-
tion laws and regulations put in place
since 1961 also diminish the cohesion
that would facilitate the accumulation of
“unwarranted influence” by the military-
industrial complex. According to Patrick
Wilson, the director of government af-
fairs for the Semiconductor Industry As-
sociation, the “defense acquisition pro-
cess is so cumbersome that many high-
tech ½rms shun government sales.” The
bureaucracy of the procurement system,
he says, is “ridiculous.”26
Calling the acquisition system “ridicu-
lous” may be an exaggeration, but not by
much–even when the stakes are very
high. For example, the Air Force has been
trying since 2002 to replace its aging ae-
rial tanker fleet, whose aircraft, on aver-
age, are more than forty-seven years old.
Yet a variety of legal and technical issues
stymied the project for years, despite its
being valued at as much as $35 billion.27
A sophisticated military-industrial com-
plex endowed with treacherous proclivi-
ties toward excessive influence would be
expected to have greater success in bring-
ing such a lucrative opportunity to fru-
ition sooner. 
Another factor diminishing the ability
of major defense ½rms to accrete un-
bounded power is the maze of legally
mandated acquisition polices intended 
to serve social purposes as much as
strengthen national security. For in-
stance, The Washington Post reports that a
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“tiny, inexperienced ½rm” received a
$250 million contract “without competi-
tion, under special set-aside exemptions
granted by Congress to help impover-
ished Alaska natives.” At the time of the
contract award, the company had only
eighteen employees and $73,000 in rev-
enue the previous year.28 However one
views the wisdom of set-asides, adher-
ence to such exemption policies seems to
counteract concerns about the dangerous
influence of huge corporate monoliths.
Of all the factors emasculating Ameri-
ca’s military-industrial complex, howev-
er, none is as signi½cant as current eco-
nomic conditions. The arms industry is
caught in the throes of forces vastly more
powerful than it could aspire to wield:
the severe global economic downturn;
the near meltdown of the U.S. ½nancial
system; and the ballooning de½cit all com-
bine to spark calls on both sides of the
political aisle for sharp cuts in discretion-
ary spending–a major portion of which
is the defense budget.
Military spending distressed and frus-
trated Eisenhower. His melancholia is cap-
tured in a 1953 remark that, though less
well known than his farewell address, is
powerful and thought-provoking: 
Every gun that is made, every warship
launched, every rocket ½red signi½es, in
the ½nal sense, a theft from those who
hunger and are not fed, those who are cold
and not clothed. This world in arms is not
spending money alone. It is spending the
sweat of its laborers, the genius of its sci-
entists, the hopes of its children.29
Although the American people have
generally endorsed expanding military
budgets since 9/11, that support may be
flagging–especially with respect to war
costs in Afghanistan. According to a usa
Today/Gallup poll in late November 2010,
60 percent of Americans worry that “costs
of the war in Afghanistan will make it
more dif½cult for the government to
address the problems facing the United
States at home.”30 Likewise, an abc
News/Washington Post poll in early De-
cember 2010 found support at historic
lows, with 60 percent of Americans char-
acterizing the war, in ½scal terms, as “not
worth ½ghting.”31
Secretary Gates, who gamely insists
that “the truth of the matter is when it
comes to the de½cit, the Department of
Defense is not the problem,”32 supports a
series of cost-saving initiatives to address
potential defense spending reductions,
including cuts in selected weapons sys-
tems. Although he wants to invest the
savings in fewer but higher-priority sys-
tems, hopes are dimming in the defense
industry that arms purchases of any kind
will escape the budgetary ax, especially
given that the president’s highly influen-
tial National Commission on Fiscal Re-
sponsibility and Reform recommends ap-
plying any savings generated by the dod
to de½cit reduction, not weapons.33
While “despondent” would be too
strong a word, there is little evidence that
arms manufacturers are bullish about the
future of arms sales. They are likely to
embrace the blunt advice issued by de-
fense analyst Loren Thompson in late
2010. Commenting on a recent solicita-
tion for a new Army ground combat vehi-
cle, Thompson surmised:
[D]efense companies need to start thinking
seriously about diversifying their product
mix away from a capricious government
customer. Diversi½cation is the “D” word
defense investors are loathe to voice, but
look at what General Dynamics accom-
plished by its foray into business jets and
you begin to see a way forward for defense
companies in what could be a very bleak
decade.34
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Clearly, the industrial part of the mili-
tary-industrial complex has not developed
in a way that might have caused Eisen-
hower great alarm. Given the relative
impotence of the defense industry, then,
how wary are the American people today
of the military’s potential for per½dy? Not
very, it seems.
While no formal assessments of the
views of the U.S. body politic have asked
this question explicitly, several polls shed
some light. For example, among the insti-
tutions in which Americans had the most
con½dence in 2010, small business ranked
second only to the military.35 However,
big business–the type one would asso-
ciate with Eisenhower’s admonition–
ranked almost at the bottom. Military of-
½cers also headed the list of institutional
leaders in whom the public had the most
con½dence, with small-business man-
agers right behind them.36 The execu-
tives of major companies, meanwhile,
trailed both groups signi½cantly. 
On values, a November 2010 Gallup
poll found that only nurses were more
highly rated in the public’s esteem than
military of½cers. Indeed, 73 percent of
Americans rated the honesty and ethical
standards of of½cers in the armed forces
as high or very high. Only 15 percent of
the public gave business executives such
high marks.37 Ironically, despite high con-
½dence in–and deep respect for–the
military, a majority of Americans also
said in 2010 that they do not believe the
United States will be the top military
power in twenty years. Strikingly, many
hold this view alongside the further be-
lief that the nation “will continue to have
combat troops regularly involved in ½ght-
ing around the world over the next two
decades.”38 How to reconcile these two
predictions is unclear; nonetheless, the
survey results suggest that the public
does not foresee an ascent of U.S. mili-
tary power.
Furthermore, affection for and con½-
dence in those serving in uniform does
not necessarily translate into political
power. General Wesley Clark’s 2004 pres-
idential campaign foundered despite ex-
emplary military service, including suc-
cessful leadership of nato forces in the
1999 Kosovo conflict. Recent elections,
including the November 2010 midterms,
have witnessed a growing number of
congressional candidates who were vet-
erans of the wars in Iraq and Afghan-
istan; most, however, have lost their
bids.39 Perhaps the veterans’ electoral
inexperience plays a role in these losses,
but the results nevertheless intimate an
electorate that readily distinguishes be-
tween the quali½cations of uniformed
military personnel and those of political
leaders.
Additionally, a series of laws and regu-
lations enacted in the aftermath of Wa-
tergate and other scandals pose signi½-
cant obstacles to the kind of military-in-
dustry collusion that underpinned Eisen-
hower’s 1961 warnings. The 1978 Ethics 
in Government Act40 and accompanying
regulations formalized conflict-of-inter-
est rules and ½nancial disclosure require-
ments designed to limit untoward influ-
ences. In a celebrated case, a senior civil-
ian Air Force acquisition of½cial was con-
victed for giving Boeing, a major defense
contractor, “preferential treatment in ex-
change for a job.”41
Rules limiting the activities of retired
of½cers were expanded in Fall 2010. A se-
ries of reports in USA Today and other
media highlighted the role of “military
mentors,” retired generals who provide
consultation services for defense pro-
grams. USA Today claimed that 89 percent
of the mentors it found “also had ½nan-
cial ties to defense contractors, who
could pro½t from the mentors’ connec-
tions.”42 As a result of those ½ndings,
Secretary Gates–who himself made a
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fortune in his post-cia career43–im-
posed a series of new rules that limited
the annual dod compensation of re-
tired generals for mentoring services to
$179,000. The policy further obliges
them to publicly disclose their ½nancial
information and business connections to
the same degree that those still serving
on active duty are obliged to do.44
What do all the developments of the
past half-century mean after the ½ftieth
anniversary of Eisenhower’s exhorta-
tion? Ledbetter claims that the warning
“is as urgent today as ever.” He points not
only to the “mounting long-term costs”
of defense but also–somewhat discon-
nectedly–to the alleged “use of martial
power” for the detention of terrorism
suspects at Guantánamo Bay and wire-
taps of Americans.45 While Eisenhower
might have been disturbed by such events,
Ledbetter seems to conflate these con-
temporary issues with the gravamen of
Eisenhower’s concern: that is, the emer-
gence of a near-conspiratorial alignment
of military leaders and their analogues in
the arms industry. 
That combination does not exist. In-
deed, one might say that Eisenhower’s
warning was heard and heeded–with
unintended consequences. The fading of
the American military-industrial com-
plex impacts U.S. military capability; the
effect on America’s Air Force is but one
illustration. Whatever influence the Air
Force may have enjoyed in Eisenhower’s
day is long gone. Consider Air Force Lieu-
tenant General David Deptula’s dismal
assessment from Fall 2010: “[W]e have a
geriatric bomber force,” Deptula con-
cludes, and “a geriatric ½ghter force. We
have a geriatric Air Force, quite frankly.”46
Aircraft age is not the only issue; num-
bers and sophistication are also a con-
cern. For example, Defense News surmised
that America’s current bomber fleet con-
stitutes a “puny force against any serious
adversary.”47 Even so, historian Michael
Auslin of the American Enterprise Insti-
tute says that today’s budget restrictions
are hitting airpower especially hard; con-
sequently, he says, “[S]ome of the stun-
ning joint creations of the Air Force and
America’s defense industrial base . . . will
likely never be repeated.” If budgetary
trends are not reversed, he warns, the Air
Force’s “future will look even grimmer
than it does now.”48
The deterioration of America’s defense
infrastructure has captured the attention
of Congress. During hearings on the de-
fense industrial base in Fall 2010, Con-
gress acknowledged “the security chal-
lenges posed by a shrinking defense
industrial base and domestic supply
chain.”49 Furthermore, Congress recog-
nized that U.S. arms makers face the
“proliferation of foreign-made and coun-
terfeit parts, outdated technology, and a
depleted manufacturing workforce.”50
But there are still too few tangible indi-
cations that “an alert and knowledge-
able citizenry” will compel the necessary
steps to ensure the appropriate level of
military-industrial muscle is met and
maintained.
Meanwhile, we must not ignore the
fact that other nations–including poten-
tial adversaries–are strengthening their
industrial base. The Pentagon’s 2010 re-
port reveals that China’s defense indus-
tries have undergone a “broad-based
transformation” since the 1990s. In fact,
“[a]ugmented by direct acquisition of
foreign weapons and technology, these
reforms have enabled China to develop
and produce advanced weapon systems
that incorporate mid-1990s technology
in many areas, and some systems–par-
ticularly ballistic missiles–that rival 
any in the world today.”51 Ominously,
China’s industry is developing air capa-
bilities to a degree that suggests China’s
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intention to challenge “U.S. air power in
the region.”52
In other developments that show the
internationalization of the arms industry,
Russia and India have signed a deal to
build hundreds of new “½fth generation”
warplanes designed to best America’s
most advanced ½ghters.53 In light of such
reports, many experts are concerned that
any additional cuts in U.S. defense spend-
ing “will dangerously erode the techno-
logical edge that America’s armed forces
depend upon, and deserve.”54 As Ilan
Berman puts it, “Stagnation [in the de-
fense industry] threatens U.S. arms supe-
riority.”55 Some analysts go further. Ac-
cording to political commentator Zbig-
niew Mazurak, “[T]he U.S. is no longer
unrivalled in terms of conventional
weapons. Conventional threats are real
and growing.”56
The problem, however, may run deep-
er. Some analysts observe an “anti-mod-
ern warfare prejudice” within the U.S. mil-
itary itself.57 Perhaps an outgrowth of the
manpower-intensive counterinsurgency
strategy in vogue today, this trend runs
counter to the “high-technology” empha-
sis that strategist Colin Gray calls “the
American way in warfare.” Indeed, Gray
contends, American society “cannot pos-
sibly prepare for, or attempt to ½ght, its
wars in any other than a technology-led
manner.”58 But the ability to maintain
such an approach depends on the exis-
tence of a vigorous, innovative, and
pro½table military-industrial enterprise.
Eisenhower’s dictum will always serve
as a useful bellwether for the disquieting
prospect of an unchecked confederation
of military and industrial power. Still, in
twenty-½rst-century America, the impor-
tance of context is becoming ever more
evident. During Eisenhower’s presiden-
cy, a robust industrial base working effec-
tively (if not always ef½ciently) with its
military counterparts addressed the im-
peratives of the Cold War confrontation
with the Soviet Union. That the perils of
“misplaced power” were largely avoided
is a critically important lesson. That is,
inevitability need not be part of the lexi-
con of this issue.
Were he alive today, Eisenhower un-
doubtedly would have recognized that
dismissing the military-industrial com-
plex as the inveterate enemy of democra-
cy is wrong and dangerous. Thanks large-
ly to Eisenhower’s eloquent expression
of caution, the United States has shown
that it can effectively limit the reach of
the military-industrial establishment.
Now the question may be whether con-
trolling influences–“sought or unsought”
–have taken us too far. 
Writing in The Wall Street Journal in late
2010, novelist Mark Helprin warns: 
[History] tells us that, entirely indepen-
dent of economic considerations, although
not a dime should be appropriated to the
military if it is not necessary, not a dime
should be withheld if it is. The proof of
this, so often and so tragically forgotten, is
that the costs of providing an undauntable
defense, whatever they may be, pale before
blood and defeat.59
Even the most ardent advocate of Ei-
senhower’s farewell address would be
wise to ponder that sentiment.
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